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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
DAVID J. ORR, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Utah Court of Appeals Case No. 
20030574-CA 
Supreme Court Case No. 20041057 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from a decision of the Utah Court of Appeals affirming an Order 
entered by the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson in the Third District Court, 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, denying Defendant's Motion to Dismiss 
and extending Defendant's probation. 
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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
DAVID J. ORR, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Utah Court of Appeals Case No. 
20030574-CA 
Supreme Court Case No. 20041057 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE DUE PROCESS NOTICE 
REQUIREMENT IN PROBATION REVOCATION, EXTENSION 
OR MODIFICATION MATTERS IT PREVIOUSLY ANNOUNCED 
IN SMITH V. COOK AND STATE V. CALL. 
It is simply incomprehensible to Defendant in this matter that the State of Utah 
chooses to read this Court's opinions in Smith v. Cook, 803 P.2d 788 (Utah 1990) 
(attached as Add. C herein) and State v. Call, 1999 UT 42, 980 P.2d 201 (Utah 1999) 
(attached as Add. D herein) as not involving a due process analysis by this Honorable 
Court. It appears that the State of Utah is so anxious to prevent an affirmation of this 
Court's due process concerns and analysis in those two cases, and in the earlier cases that 
1 
lead up to its opinions in those two cases, (see infra) that it chooses to ignore direct and 
specific language from this Court relating to that analysis. 
The fact that this Court engaged in a due process analysis in State v. Call 
particularly, can be simply found in its grant of Certiorari in the instant case in which this 
Court stated: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to Rule 45 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari is granted only as to the following issues: 
1. Whether the due process concerns recited in State v. 
Call 980 P.2d 201, 203 (Utah 1999) require that a 
probationer be notified of the State's intent to seek 
revocation, modification or extension of probation 
prior to the expiration of the existing probation term. 
. . . (emphasis added). 
Even though the State of Utah in its responsive brief specifically states: "[I]n fact, 
Call does not expressly recite any "'due process concern,'" this Court, in its grant of 
Certiorari in this matter, has specifically stated that "due process concerns" were recited 
in State v. Call. Apparently, the State of Utah chooses to put on blinders and pretend that 
State v. Call did not express due process concerns and its brief is written accordingly. 
See Respondent's Responsive Brief at 9. 
In fact, this Court, citing its prior cases of State v. Green, 757 P.2d 462 (Utah 
1988) (attached as Add. B herein) and Smith v. Cook, supra (attached as Add. C herein), 
specifically stated in the opening paragraphs of its analysis in State v. Call: 
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These cases (State v. Green and Smith v. Cook) instruct that if 
it is the intent of the State to extend the probationary period 
beyond its original term, the State must take definitive action 
to extend the term before the expiration date, and the 
probationer must be given notice of that intent. Otherwise, 
the probationer is left in a state of uncertainty, not knowing 
whether to continue to observe the terms of his probation. 
1999 UT 42 at 111 (emphasis added). 
Although the State of Utah in its responsive brief notes the words "due process" do 
not appear in the Call Opinion, such an observation is misleading in light of the fact that this 
Court was specifically validating the evolution of its due process analysis undertaken in both 
Green and Smith v. Cook in the Call case. 
This Court has held in a number of cases that the due process right guaranteed to 
Utah citizens under Article 1 § 7 of the Utah Constitution, as well as the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution is not a technical conception with a fixed 
content unrelated to time, place, and circumstances; instead, it is flexible and, being based 
on the concept of fairness, should afford the procedural protections that the given 
situation demands. Dairy Product Services, Inc. v. City ofWellsville, 13 P.3d 581 (Utah 
2000); Peterson v. Utah Bd. of Pardons, 931 P.2d 147 (Utah 1997); In re Worthen, 926 
P.2d 853 (Utah 1996); Neel v. Holden, 886 P.2d 1097 (Utah 1994); Wells v. Childrens Aid 
Soc. Of Utah, 681 P.2d 199 (1994). 
This Court has ruled further that the minimum requirements of due process are 
adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard in a meaningful manner. This Court has 
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held that what constitutes "adequate notice" depends upon the circumstances of the case 
in question. Dairy Product Services, Inc. v. City ofWellsville, supra; Miller v. USAA 
Cas. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 6, 44 P.3d 663; In Re Worthen, supra; Wells v. Childrens Aid Soc. 
Of Utah, supra; Nelson v. Jacobson, 669 P.2d 1207 (Utah 1983); Celebrity Club Inc. v. 
Utah Liquor Control Com'n, 657 P.2d 1293 (Utah 1982); Gribble v. Gribble, 583 P.2d 64 
(Utah 1978); Bigler v. Greenwood, 123 Utah 60, 254 P.2d 843 (Utah 1953). 
This Court's due process notice analysis which culminated in the case of State v. 
Call, essentially began with the case of State v. Bonza, 106 Utah 553, 150 P.2d 970 
(1944) when this Court, then situated, held that a probationer is entitled to written notice 
of the ground or grounds on which probation revocation is sought. In the later case of 
State v. Cowdell, 626 P.2d 487 (1981)(attached as Add. A herein) this Court held that the 
right to notice to which a probationer was entitled had not been accorded to the defendant 
in that case. This Court found that such lack of notice was prejudicial and required 
reversal of the revocation order and remand. In analyzing the circumstances of that 
probation revocation case, the Court stated as follows: 
. . . [I]n revoking a probation, a court may not ignore 
fundamental precepts of fairness protected by the due 
process clause. This Court in State v. Bonza, 106 Utah 553, 
150 P.2d 970 (1944), and more recently, the United States 
Supreme Court in Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 93 S.Ct. 
1756, 36 L.Ed. 2d 656 (1973), have held that a probationer is 
entitled to written notice of the ground or grounds on which 
revocation is sought . . . . 
626 P.2d at 488 (emphasis added). 
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In the 1988 case of State v. Green, supra, this Court considered an argument by the 
State of Utah that the probation revocation statute then in effect was tolled when any 
violation occurred within the period of probation and that there was no time limit for 
initiating a revocation action. In rejecting the State's position, Justice Durham, writing 
for a unanimous Court, opined and held: 
The State's interpretation of the statute would create absurd 
results. Defendants would be left in a perpetual state of 
limbo; although their probation would appear to have 
terminated, usually by entry of an order to that effect, 
defendants would actually be subject to a continued term of 
fictional supervision. This indefinite probationary term could 
theoretically be revoked many years after the original 
imposition and suspension of sentence. Decades could pass 
and then, based upon the discovery of a probation violation 
which had occurred during the statutory period, a court could 
revoke a term of probation thought to have been terminated 
long ago. This construction would obviate the certainty and 
regularity created by the statute and ignore the plain meaning 
of the word 'terminate.' 
757P.2dat464. 
While this Court did not use the term "due process of law" in that opinion, the above-
quoted language clearly evidenced a due process notice analysis, as well as a statutory 
analysis. 
What constitutes "adequate" notice for due process purposes in the context of 
probation violation cases was decided by this Court in the case of Smith v. Cook, supra. 
In that case, this Court specifically held that under the statute then applicable, Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-18-1 (l)(Supp. 1981), "the trial court lacked the authority to revoke Smith's 
5 
probation because Smith was not given notice of the revocation proceedings prior to the 
expiration of his probation." 803 P.2d at 793. The court at that time found a due process 
notice requirement, even though that version of Section 77-18-1 relating to probation 
revocation proceedings did not require that a defendant be given notice of the revocation 
proceedings prior to the expiration of his probation. Chief Justice Hall, writing for the 
majority, explained the Court's decision as follows: 
A review of the relevant statutes and case law leads us to the 
conclusion that in order for a court to retain its authority over 
a probationer who is not actively evading supervision, the 
probationer must be served with the order to show cause 
within the period of probation. 
803 P.2d at 794. 
While noting that § 77-18-l(Supp. 1981) did not explicitly deal with the issue, the 
Court opined that that Section did place a significant amount of emphasis on the nature 
and degree of notice to which an individual is entitled prior to a revocation hearing. The 
court stated as follows: 
Section 77-18-l(5)(b)(c)(Supp. 1981) not only states that a 
court 'shall cause to be served on the defendant a copy of the 
affidavit and order to show cause', but also provides that the 
order to show cause shall inform the defendant of the nature 
of the accusations against him, his right to counsel, and his 
right to present evidence. The emphasis on notice in § 77-18-
l(Supp. 1981) is consistent with the assertion that a court 
retains the authority to revoke probation if the 
probationer is served with notice of the revocation 
proceedings within the probation period. 
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The assertion that a probationer is entitled to notice within the 
period of probation in order for the court to retain the 
authority to revoke probation is consistent with the rationale 
underlying our decision in Green. If probationers are given 
notice within the probation period, there is no danger of 
placing them 'in a state of perpetual limbo (where) although 
their probation would appear to have terminated . . . 
defendants would actually be subject to a continued term of 
fictional supervision' (citing Green). Under such an 
approach, all parties concerned would be aware of the 
proceedings and the allegations underlying the proceedings at 
the time the probation terminates. Probationers could also be 
assured that no new proceedings or proceedings under 
different grounds could be brought against them once the 
probation period is ended. Therefore, probationers would not 
be in a state of limbo where it would appear that their 
probation had terminated but where further proceedings could 
be brought against them. However, if a trial court was able 
to retain the authority to revoke probation without giving 
notice to the probationer, there may be situations in which it 
could appear that the probation had ended when in fact the 
court may, at some later date, reassert its jurisdiction over the 
defendant for the purpose of revoking probation. 
803 P.2d at 795 (emphasis added). 
Such a situation specifically occurred in the instant case where the only 
information provided to Defendant Orr prior to his termination date of May 12, 2003 was 
that his probation officer intended to recommend termination of his probation. The 
Defendant and his attorney believed that his probation ended on May 12, 2003. The State 
does not dispute that, absent appropriate State action, such would have been his 
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termination date.1 As argued in his opening brief, this subjected Defendant Orr to the 
possibility that the Court may have found his failure to make restitution payments after he 
believed his probation ended to be a violation of his probation and could have resulted in 
his incarceration. In fact, the District Court so noted. See Appellant's Opening Brief at 
p.16.2 
Despite the State of Utah's assertion that none of this constituted a due process 
analysis, the decision in Smith v. Cook clearly belies that conclusion: 
Such an approach is also in accord with the decisions of this 
Court, as well as the United States Supreme Court, holding 
that the guarantees of the fundamental fairness embodied 
in the due process clause of the United States Constitution 
entitle probationers to written notice of the accusations 
against them prior to their revocation hearings. 
803 P.2d at 795 (emphasis added).5 
This Court went on in that opinion to talk about the consistency of this due process 
analysis with the general rule regarding jurisdiction in civil cases. The Court also talked 
about the fact that there would be no practicable problem with serving probationers 
lSee Resp. Br. at 4 0'[O]n May 9, 2003, three days before Defendant's probation 
was to expire by operation of law . . . . " ) 
2
"Now. As an alternative I suppose I could terminate probation and send this to 
debt collection and then deal with this on a contempt basis, but I'm not going to do that 
until I have to, and at this point in time I don't have to." R. 481, p.39, 1. 21-24. 
3It is interesting to note that the Court in Smith v. Cook cited State v. Cowdell, 
supra for this proposition in a footnote clarifying that the Cowdell case did indeed involve 
a due process analysis. 
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"because, due to the nature of probation, they are already under the supervision of the 
state." Id. The Court noted that a different rule may need to be followed in some 
situations such as where the probationer is actively avoiding service or is evading 
supervision of probation authorities, but found that there was no such situation in the facts 
of that particular case. 
There simply can be no question that, whether the Court used the actual words 
"due process" or not, the Bonza, Cowdell Green and Smith v. Cook cases were all based 
upon a due process analysis under both the Utah State Constitution and the United States 
Constitution. Therefore, when this Court issued its opinion in State v. Call, it, at least 
implicitly, was affirming and reiterating the due process rationale in these prior cases. 
There can simply be no question that State v. Call engaged in a due process analysis, no 
matter how the State of Utah would like to try to read the Call opinion to state otherwise.4 
In fact, the Utah Court of Appeals, whose opinions are obviously not authoritative 
to this Court but are instructive, used the same due process analysis and cited Smith v. 
Cook in the cases of State v. Rawlings, 893 P.2d 1063 (Utah App. 1995) and State v. 
Grate, 947 P.2d 1161 (Utah App. 1997). In both of these cases, the Utah Court of 
Appeals followed the lead of this Court and specifically found, in a due process analysis 
4
"These cases instruct that if it is the intent of the State to extend the probationary 
period beyond its original term, the State must take definitive action to extend the term 
before the expiration date, and the probationer must be given notice of that intent." 
Call 1999 UT 42 at fll 1 (emphasis added). 
9 
in each case, that the defendant probationer had had his due process rights violated by not 
being served within the appropriate time period.5 
This Court is respectfully requested to overlook the obfuscation of the State of 
Utah in this case and culminate the evolution of its due process analysis on this issue in 
the instant case, where it rules once and for all that the right to due process of law 
guaranteed to citizens pursuant to Article 1 § 7 of the Utah Constitution and the 14th 
Amendment of the United States Constitution specifically requires that a defendant be 
served with notice of probation violation, extension or modification proceedings prior to 
the date that his or her probation expires by operation of law; and failure to do so voids 
any further proceedings by the trial court. 
The State of Utah asserts that it had searched for and found no case from any other 
jurisdiction supporting the Defendant's view in this case. It asserts that the only case to 
directly address the claim rejected it, and cited People v. Ritter, 464 N.W.2d 919 (Mich. 
Ct. App. 1991). Defendant agrees that he can find no authority for any other State ruling 
as this State has with regard to the due process of rights of Defendant relating to service 
5
"Because defendant was not given proper notice of the probation extension 
hearing before the probation expired . . . the trial court lacked the authority to extend 
defendant's probation." Rawlings, 893 P.2d at 1071; "We conclude that a probationer is 
not charged with a probation violation within § 77-18-l(8)(a) until he or she has received 
written notice both of the nature of the allegations against him or her and of the pendency 
of an enforcement action in the trial court requiring a response. We further conclude that 
because Grate was not charged with a probation violation within the original term of his 
probation, his probation terminated as a matter of law . . . . " Grate, 947 P.2d at 1168. 
10 
prior to the expiration of his probation. However, the case of People v. Ritter cited by the 
State, contains only dicta in a footnote that suggests that court was not persuaded that due 
process required defendant be served with notice of probation revocation proceedings 
within the period of probation. However, in that same footnote, this lower Michigan 
Appellate Court added immediately thereafter "When, as in this case, the defendant 
absconds from probationary supervision, whether within or without the court's territorial 
jurisdiction, he cannot be served with notice of the probation revocation proceedings if he 
cannot be found." That court went on to state in the same footnote that it was 
distinguishing People v. Jackson, 168 Mich. Ct. App. 280, 424 N.W.2d 38 (1988) 
. . . because that case involved ex parte amendment of the 
actual terms of the defendant's probation order. Clearly, this 
Court concluded that actual notice within the period of 
probation was required in that case because the amendment 
was an order of confinement resulting in a fundamental 
change of the defendant's liberty interests and the nature of 
his probation. In the present case, no such fundamental 
change is implicated.... 
Ritter, supra, at 923 FN 3. 
Therefore, the Michigan Court found that under appropriate circumstances, due 
process would require that Defendant receive notice within the probation period but 
found that in the particular case of People v. Ritter, since the defendant had absconded 
from the jurisdiction and could not be located to be served, due process did not require 
service upon him prior to the termination of his probationary period. This is a much 
11 
different situation than exists in the instant case. No claim was ever made that Defendant 
Orr absconded from supervision or could not be found. 
It is the contention of Defendant in the instant matter that this Court has always 
gleaned its due process analysis from the various versions of the statute which have 
governed probation violation, modification and extension hearings, none of which have 
ever explicitly stated that notice to probationer prior to termination of probation by 
operation of law was required. Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1. While the State of Utah 
argues that subsection 11(b) of that statute contains a tolling provision which allows the 
court's jurisdiction to be extended independent of the notice to Defendant, that tolling 
provision does not eliminate several decades of decisions by this Court finding that, 
implied in the general notice provisions of that statute is the requirement that the 
probationer be provided notice prior to the expiration of his probation term; and that the 
State's commencement of probation revocation, extension or modification proceedings is 
not enough to relieve the State of its due process burden to apprise the defendant of the 
pendency of the proceedings. The analysis used in the cases leading up to State v. Call 
discussed in this brief is still applicable under the present version of the statute. The 
reasoning cited by this Court in State v. Green, Smith v. Cook and State v. Call is still 
applicable under the present version of the statute. 
It is interesting to speculate about what might have happened if the Defendant, 
having been told by his probation officer that the State was recommending termination of 
12 
his probation, and having been told by his attorney that his probation terminated by 
operation of law on May 12, 2003, decided to leave the State or the country on May 13, 
2003, believing he was a free man and needed no one's permission to do so. Since he 
was not given notice that the State had begun the probation revocation proceedings with a 
progress violation report apparently filed on May 9, 2003, as found by the District Court 
and upheld by the Court of Appeals, the Defendant would have been in great jeopardy to 
have had a warrant issued for his arrest and to be subject to probation revocation 
proceedings which could have sent him to prison. He therefore could have been highly 
prejudiced, and, in fact, was prejudiced by virtue of the fact that he did not pay his May 
and June restitution payments based upon the advice of his attorney and his belief that his 
probation terminated by operation of law on May 12, 2003. This situation could have 
easily been avoided if the State of Utah had taken the time and made the effort to serve 
him with the progress violation report at the same time it filed it with the District Court. 
The explanation of the probation agent in his testimony before the District Court was 
simply that it was not convenient to serve Defendant when he filed his report with the 
court and the court issued its Order to Show Cause, because the agent had planned to see 
him on May 19, 2003 (some seven days after the probation would have terminated by 
operation of law) anyway.6 
6
"Q. BY MR. KELLER: Why did you wait until May 19th to serve it on the 
Defendant? 
A. That was the soonest I was going to see him. 
13 
It is fundamentally unfair that the probation agent and the District Court would 
take steps to either revoke, modify or extend Defendant's probation without notifying him 
of that fact prior to the time everyone agreed his probation was to terminate, simply 
because it was apparently not convenient for the probation agent to do so. This Court is 
asked to rule that due process of law continues to require that a probationer receive notice 
of an intent on the part of the lower court or the State of Utah to extend his probation 
prior to the time his probation is scheduled to terminate by operation of law. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT DID NOT WILLFULLY VIOLATE HIS PROBATION, 
AND THE COURT MADE NO FINDINGS IN THAT REGARD. 
Defendant Orr argued in its opening brief that the trial court had failed to make 
any findings specifically noting he had willfully violated his probation terms. Defendant 
argued that Utah law requires that any failure to meet the terms and conditions of 
probation must be willful, and cited State v. Hodges, 798 P.2d 270, 274 (Utah App. 1990) 
and Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336 (Utah 1979) for this proposition. The State of 
Utah's response is simply that the Hodges case and the case of Bearden v. Georgia, 461 
U.S. 660 (1983) stand for the proposition that defendant may not be incarcerated unless it 
can be proven that he willfully refused to pay his fine or restitution. The State argues that 
Q. So you didn't make any extra effort based upon the fact that you knew his 
probation was scheduled to terminate on May 12th; is that correct? 
A. Yeah I didn't make any extra effort." R. 481, p. 22,1. 8-17. 
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Defendant in this case did not have his probation revoked and suffer incarceration; but 
rather, he merely suffered an extension of probation and so his case does not fall within 
the mandate of those cases. However, at no time either in the trial court, the Court of 
Appeals, or in proceedings in this Court, has the State argued that Defendant failed to 
meet his required restitution payments as set by his probation officer and the District 
Court. The State simply argues that he failed to pay the entire amount of restitution. 
The State's assertion that the Hodges case involved a revocation of probation and 
not an extension is correct as far as it goes; but it is Defendant's position that Hodges 
stands for the proposition that where the alleged violation is a failure to pay a fine and/or 
restitution, the sentencing court must still find that probationer willfully violated the terms 
and conditions of his probation in order to extend, modify or revoke that probation. 
Where, as here, "[T]he Defendant has made consistent monthly payments of $1,000.00 
towards restitution,"7 and the State fails to show any willful violation of the court's 
restitution order, he should not be considered in violation for failure to pay the full 
amount ordered.8 
7Progress/Violation Report, p. 2 under the heading "Restitution"; R. 405-406. See 
Add. E. 
8Utah law provides a trial court with alternatives where defendant has faithfully 
made his restitution payments, but has been unable to pay the full amount of restitution 
ordered. In Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(10)(a)(ii)(A) the law provides: "If, upon 
expiration or termination of the probation, under subsection (10)(a)(i), there remains an 
unpaid balance upon the account receivable as defined in § 76-3-201.1, the court may 
retain jurisdiction of the case and continue the defendant on bench probation for the 
limited purpose of enforcing the payment of the account receivable;" and in subsection 
15 
In the only case Defendant could find on the subject, a Court of Appeals case 
which is not authoritative but should be instructive to this Court, the Utah Court of 
Appeals specifically indicated that in the context of an alleged failure to pay restitution, 
(i.e. as grounds for revocation/modification of probation) "a finding of willfulness merely 
requires a finding that the probationer did not make bona fide efforts to meet the 
conditions of his probation." State v. Peterson, 869 P.2d 989, 991 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
No such finding was made by the trial judge in the instant matter. Without finding both a 
violation and willfulness (i.e. the absence of bona fide efforts to pay restitution), the 
District Court had no basis for ordering an extension of Defendant's probation even if the 
due process aspect of the case is ignored. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant urges this Court to complete the natural evolution of its prior line of 
cases by finding that a probationer is entitled to due process of law through the service of 
notice upon him of the State's efforts to revoke, extend or modify his probation prior to 
the termination of his probation by operation of law. Defendant was not afforded 
fundamental fairness in that he was essentially led to believe by his probation officer that 
his probation would be terminated as of May 12, 2003, a fact not disputed by the State. 
(B) the statute states: "In accordance with § 77-18-6, the court shall record in the registry 
of civil judgments any unpaid balance not already recorded and immediately transfer 
responsibility to collect the account to the Office of State Debt Collection." These are 
alternatives available to the court in Defendant Orr's situation. 
16 
He was not served with notice until May 19, 2003 of the fact that the court had decided to 
take further action against him. 
For these and the other reasons outlined in Appellant's opening brief and this reply 
brief, it is respectfully requested that this Court reverse both the Court of Appeals and the 
District Court and order that Defendant be released from custody, with his probation 
having been terminated by operation of law. 
Dated this l_2z day of ^ U l V , 2005. 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C. 
£ A R & ¥ R . KELLER 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
17 
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STATE v. COWDELL 
Cite as, Utah, 626 P.2d 487 
opinion of a defense witness, John Watson, 
as to the reputation of the state's witness 
Kimberly Horrocks, for truth and veracity. 
We have no disagreement with the general 
proposition that if an impeaching witness 
knows such reputation of the other witness 
he may testify concerning that fact. The 
basis of the court's ruling was that in ques-
tioning Mr. Watson it was shown that he 
had never discussed, or heard any discus-
sion, nor any remarks made, about Ms. Hor-
rocks1 reputation for truth and veracity in 
the community, but that his opinion was 
based solely on his personal acquaintance 
with her. A leading authority of the sub-
ject, Jones on Evidence, Sixth Edition 1972, 
Section 26:21, page 225, makes this state-
ment: 
According to the weight of authority, the 
opinion of the impeaching witness is to be 
based upon his knowledge of the reputa-
tion of the other witness and not upon his 
individual opinion of his qualities or char-
acter. 
The trial court's ruling was in harmony 
with that principle. 
The defendant has been accorded his en-
titlement to a full and fair consideration of 
his contentions by the court and the jury, 
with all of the ample protections which our 
law affords, and has been judged guilty of 
the offense charged. We are not persuaded 
that there has been any such error as to 
justify reversing his conviction. 
Affirmed. No costs awarded. 
Utah 487 
The STATE of Utah, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
v. 
Marc R. COWDELL, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 16761. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Feb. 24, 1981. 
Defendant appealed from judgment of 
the Third District Court, Salt Lake County, 
David B. Dee, J., revoking his probation on 
grounds of conviction for driving under in-
fluence of alcohol. The Supreme Court, 
Stewart, J., held that: (1) failure to men-
tion in order to show cause the ground 
relied upon by court in revoking probation 
violated procedural rights afforded proba-
tioner and required reversal of revocation 
order and remand, and (2) notice of alleged 
robbery as grounds for revocation could be 
inadequate for failure to state time of oc-
currence. 
Reversed and remanded. 
1. Criminal Law <s=>982.9 
Although decision of trial court to mod-
ify or revoke probation is basically discre-
tionary matter, in revoking probation a 
court may not ignore fundamental percepts 
of fairness protected by due process clause. 
U.S.C.A.Const. Amends 5, 14. 
HALL and STEWART, JJ., concur. 
MAUGHAN, C. J., and WILKINS, J., do 
not participate herein. 
2. Criminal Law ®=>982.9(6) 
Trial court's reliance in revoking proba-
tion on grounds not mentioned in order to 
show cause was violation of limited proce-
dural rights afforded probationer in pro-
tecting his restricted, but valuable, right to 
personal liberty. U.S.C.A.Const. Amends. 
5,14. 
3. Indictment and Information <&=» 71.2(3) 
Lack of notice of reason for which per-
son might be deprived of liberty denies such 
person right to prepare defense and effec-
tively destroys value of any defense that is 
available. U.S.CA.Const Amends. 5, 14. 
<±oo w uul two rAUirii; KEFUKTER, 2d SERIES 
4. Criminal Law <©=>1177 
Failure of notice to probationer of 
ground relied upon in revoking probation 
was prejudicial and required reversal of 
revocation order and remand. U.S.C.A. 
Const. Amends. 5, 14. 
5. Criminal Law <s=» 982.9(4) 
Notice given of alleged robbery as 
grounds for revocation could be inadequate 
for failure to state time of occurrence, 
since, although pleading in criminal case 
may not be defective for failure to allege 
time particular offense occurred, probation-
er may be prejudiced in his efforts to 
present controverting evidence where he is 
not informed of time of occurrence of al-
leged crime and has no preliminary hearing, 
discovery or trial of the alleged crime by 
means of which he might obtain notice of 
time of occurrence prior to his revocation 
hearing. U.C.A.1953, 77-35-4. 
Bruce C. Lubeck, Salt Lake City, for de-
fendant and appellant. 
Robert B. Hansen, Atty. Gen., Craig L. 
Barlow, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, 
for plaintiff and respondent. 
STEWART, Justice: 
Defendant appeals an order revoking his 
probation and ordering him committed to 
serve a one-year sentence for a theft con-
viction. Defendant contends that the lower 
court's acceptance of and reliance on police 
reports received prior to the revocation 
hearing, without defendant's knowledge, re-
sulted in an unfair hearing. He also chal-
lenges the trial court's reliance on a report 
of prior probation violations, not mentioned 
in the order to show cause, without giving 
him the chance to rebut such charges. In 
addition defendant claims that the notice he 
received of the ground on which revocation 
was sought was inadequate because of a 
failure to state the time of the alleged 
robbery. 
On May 4,1979, defendant pleaded guilty 
to a third-degree felony offense of theft. 
Upon being sentenced to one year in the 
Salt Lake County jail for an offense in the 
next lower degree pursuant to § 76-3-402, 
Utah Code Ann., (1953), as amended, he was 
granted a stay of execution and was placed 
on probation for one year. On October 31, 
1979, an agent for the adult probation and 
parole department filed an affidavit with 
the court alleging that defendant had vio-
lated the conditions of his probation by 
committing the crime of aggravated rob-
bery. The court issued an order to show 
cause why defendant's probation should not 
be revoked and caused the order and affida-
vit to be served on the defendant while in 
jail. 
A hearing was held November 1, 1979. 
Defendant, represented by counsel, denied 
the allegations contained in the affidavit. 
A further hearing was set for November 8, 
1979. The State presented a witness who 
identified defendant as the robber. De-
fendant presented a probation officer who 
testified that he had given the court copies 
of a police report and an incident report 
prior to the hearing. The report showed 
that the defendant had been convicted of 
driving under the influence of alcohol in 
violation of his probation. 
[11 The decision of a trial court to modi-
fy or revoke a probation is basically a dis-
cretionary matter, § 77-18-1, U.C.A., 
(1953), as amended. Nevertheless, in revok-
ing a probation, a court may not ignore 
fundamental precepts of fairness protected 
by the due process clause. This Court in 
State v. Bonza, 106 Utah 553, 150 P.2d 970 
(1944), and more recently, the United States 
Supreme Court in Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 
U.S. 778, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 
(1973), have held that a probationer is enti-
tled to written notice of the ground or 
grounds on which revocation is sought. 
The order to show cause in this case claimed 
only one ground—the commission of an ag-
gravated robbery. But the transcript of 
the probation revocation hearing reveals 
that the court relied solely on another 
ground in revoking the probation: 
THE COURT: Well, let me set the 
matter at rest as far as the Court is 
concerned. 
* * * * * * 
ESTATE OF 
Cite as, Uta 
As far as the police report which indi-
cates the substance of the arrest and the 
booking for the charge of Aggravated 
Robbery, it had no influence in the 
Courts determination. Prior sentence of 
the DUI September the 2nd of 1979 
which occurred after the probation for 
which I gave this defendant a break is 
grounds on which I can revoke his proba-
tion. That sentence has been imposed. 
Probation has been revoked by my Order. 
[2,3] The ground relied on—the convic-
tion for driving under the influence of alco-
hol—was not mentioned in the order to 
show cause. This was a clear violation of 
even the limited procedural rights afforded 
a probationer in protecting his restricted, 
though nonetheless valuable, right to per-
sonal liberty. See State v. Bonza, supra; 
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, supra. See also State 
v. Zolantakis, 70 Utah 296, 259 P. 1044 
(1927). Lack of notice of the reason for 
which a person might be deprived of liberty 
completely denies that person the right to 
prepare a defense and effectively destroys 
the value of any defense that is available. 
[4] The right of notice to which a proba-
tioner was entitled was not accorded the 
defendant in the instant case. The error 
was prejudicial and requires reversal of the 
revocation order and a remand. 
[5] Defendant's additional claim, that 
the notice given of the alleged robbery as 
grounds for revocation is inadequate for 
failure to state the time of the occurrence, 
is not without merit. We recognize that a 
pleading in a criminal case may not be 
defective for failure to allege the time a 
particular offense occurred, § 77-35-4, 
Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended, but the 
instant proceeding is distinguishable. Prior 
to a determination of guilt or innocence at 
trial, a defendant can ascertain the details 
of the criminal charge at preliminary hear-
ing and through discovery techniques so as 
to be able to prepare a proper defense. 
Here, however, defendant had not been for-
mally charged with an offense prior to the 
hearing and had no preliminary hearing, 
tOSS v. ROSS Utah 489 
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discovery, or trial of the issue. According 
to State v. Bonza, a. probationer is entitled 
to an opportunity to present evidence to 
refute the claimed violation of probation. 
Yet, without being informed of the time of 
the occurrence of the alleged crime, a crime 
which defendant denies having committed, 
he may well have been seriously prejudiced 
in his efforts to present controverting evi-
dence. 
The order of revocation is reversed, and 
the matter is remanded to the district court 
for proceedings not inconsistent herewith. 
No costs. 
MAUGHAN, C. J., and HALL and WIL-
KINS,* JJ., concur. 
CROCKETT, J., heard the arguments but 
does not participate herein. 
/ y w \ 
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In the Matter of the ESTATE of David 
E. ROSS, Deceased, 
v. 
E. Roderick ROSS, Respondent. 
No. 16816. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Feb. 26, 1981. 
Personal representative of decedent 
brought an action to determine whether 
decedent had made completed inter vivos 
gifts of certain shares of corporate stock to 
his son. The Third District Court, Salt 
Lake County, David B. Dee, J., held that 
the inter vivos gifts of the stock were valid, 
and son's brother and sister appealed. The 
Supreme Court, Howe, J., held that the 
inter vivos gifts of stock to son were com-
plete and valid without manual delivery of 
*WILKINS, J., acted on this case prior to his 
resignation. 
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STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Terry Vernon GREEN, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 870137. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
June 14, 1988. 
Defendant appealed from order of the 
Second District Court, Davis County, Doug-
las L. Cornaby, J., revoking his probation. 
The Supreme Court, Durham, J., held that 
trial court did not have authority to revoke 
defendant's probation after defendant's 
probationary period had expired by opera-
tion of statute. 
Reversed and remanded. 
1. Criminal Law <®=>1208.2, 1208.3(1) 
Judges may exercise sentencing discre-
tion within those limits established by legis-
lature; power to fix sentencing limits and 
power to suspend sentence in favor of pro-
bation are not inherent in judiciary but 
must be authorized by statute. 
2. Criminal Law <®=>982.9 
Power to revoke probation must be 
exercised within legislatively established 
limits. 
3. Constitutional Law <s=»52 
Criminal Law <s»978 
Statute providing for automatic termi-
nation of probation after 18 months with no 
probation violations is not unconstitutional 
limitation on sentencing power of judiciary. 
U.C.A.1953, 77-18-l(10)(a) (1984). 
4. Criminal Law <®=>982.7 
Trial court did not have authority to 
revoke defendant's probation after defend-
ant's probationary period had expired by 
operation of statute providing for automat-
ic termination of probation after 18 months 
with no probation violations, although 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 was amended in 
1985 and 1987. See 1985 Utah Laws ch. 229, 
§ 1; 1987 Utah Laws ch. 114, § 1. The provi-
court determined that violation occurred 
during probationary period. U.C.A.1953, 
77-18-l(10)(a) (1984). 
Dale E. Stratford, Ogden, for defendant 
and appellant. 
David L. Wilkinson, David B. Thompson, 
Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and appellee. 
DURHAM, Justice: 
Defendant appeals from the trial court's 
revocation of his probation. He claims that 
his probation term had already been termi-
nated by operation of law pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-18-l(10)(a) (Supp.1984),1 
which provides for automatic termination 
of probation after eighteen months with no 
probation violations, and that the trial 
court lacked authority to revoke probation 
after the expiration of the statutory period. 
Defendant pleaded guilty on February 7, 
1984, to a charge of issuing bad checks 
under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505 (1978). 
He was sentenced by the trial court on May 
29, 1984, to an indeterminate term of zero 
to five years in the Utah State Prison, fined 
$1,500, and ordered to pay restitution. The 
court suspended the prison term and the 
fine and placed defendant on probation. 
Defendant agreed as one condition of pro-
bation that he would not violate federal, 
state, or local laws. 
Defendant's case was reviewed several 
times by the court. On one of these occa-
sions, February 18, 1986, an Adult Proba-
tion and Parole (AP & P) officer reported 
that defendant had been charged with two 
counts of sodomy on a child and one count 
of attempted rape of a child. All of these 
offenses were alleged to have been commit-
ted during April, May, and June 1985, a 
time period within the eighteen-month stat-
utory term of defendant's probation. De-
fendant was convicted of all three offenses 
on June 26, 1986. 
AP & P filed an affidavit of probation 
violation with the court on August 5, 1986. 
Because the court was informed that de-
sions defendant relies upon in his challenge are 
currently found in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-18-l(7)(a) (Supp.1987). 
STATE v, 
Cite as 757 P.2d 
fendant had appealed the June convictions, 
the probation violation matter was contin-
ued to permit the appeal to be decided. No 
order respecting the status of defendant's 
probation was entered. On February 3, 
1987, the court determined that defendant 
had not filed an appeal from the convic-
tions and found defendant in violation of 
his probation. Defendant requested a 
hearing on disposition. Before the sched-
uled date of the hearing, he petitioned this 
Court for a writ of prohibition in order to 
halt the lower court's sentencing hearing. 
We denied the writ. On March 25, 1987, 
the trial court held that Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-18-l(10)(a) (Interim Supp.1984) was 
an unconstitutional limitation on the sen-
tencing power of judges. On March 31, 
1987, defendant was ordered to serve the 
term of zero to five years originally im-
posed upon him for the bad check convic-
tion. A certificate of probable cause was 
issued, and this appeal followed. 
Neither defendant nor the State claims 
on appeal that the lower court was correct 
in holding that Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-18-l(10)(a) is unconstitutional. Both 
agree that this holding was unnecessarily 
broad. However, the State argues that the 
statute does not automatically terminate 
probation—and therefore does not auto-
matically terminate a judge's continuing 
jurisdiction over a defendant—unless a de-
fendant commits no probation violations 
within the eighteen-month statutory term. 
The State argues for an interpretation of 
the statute that would allow a trial court to 
revoke probation after the expiration of the 
eighteen-month period upon discovery that 
a parole violation occurred during that peri-
od. This interpretation, the State claims, 
furthers the purpose of probation because, 
regardless of when a violation becomes 
known to the State, the defendant has vio-
lated the terms of his probation and the 
public trust associated with probation. 
Defendant argues not only that the stat-
ute is constitutional, but also that proba-
tion terminates by operation of law eigh-
teen months after it is ordered if no proba-
tion violations have been reported to the 
court. Unless the court acts to revoke 
probation or extend the term of probation 
GREEN Utah 463 
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for another eighteen months, according to 
defendant, it loses jurisdiction over a de-
fendant and cannot order execution of the 
underlying sentence upon discovery of a 
prior probation violation. 
This Court has previously held that while 
courts possess judicial discretion in the sen-
tencing of defendants, the power to define 
crimes and fix the punishment for those 
crimes is vested in the legislature. In 
State v. Bishop, 111 P.2d 261 (Utah 1986), 
we held that the minimum mandatory sen-
tencing scheme adopted by the legislature 
for child sexual abuse crimes was constitu-
tional. The defendant in Bishop claimed 
that Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-403.1 (Supp. 
1987) infringed upon the separation of pow-
ers provision in the Utah Constitution be-
cause it left no power in judges to suspend 
sentences in favor of probation. In reject-
ing this contention, we examined the histo-
ry of judicial sentencing power and deter-
mined that at common law and after state-
hood, the legislative branch possessed the 
power to fix punishment for crimes, as long 
as the punishment was not cruel or un-
usual. IcL at 263-64. 
[1-3] In Bishop, 717 P.2d at 264, we 
cited with approval language from Mutart 
v. Pratt, 51 Utah 246, 170 P. 67 (1917), an 
early Utah case. In Mutart, this Court 
stated: 
That the Legislature of this state has the 
sole power to fix punishment to be in-
flicted for a particular crime, with the 
limitation only that it be not cruel or 
excessive, will not be questioned. That it 
may fix any punishment, subject to the 
above limitation, and leave no discretion 
whatever in the courts as to the extent or 
degree of punishment is a well-recog-
nized and universally accepted doctrine, 
and under a statute fixing a definite peri-
od the court has no more discretion as to 
the punishment than the police officer 
whose duty it is to carry the punishment 
into effect The right of the court to 
inflict any punishment at all is given it 
by the Legislature, and without some act 
on the part of the lawmaking power no 
464 Utah 757 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
such power or duty would be vested 
therein 
51 Utah at 250, 170 P. at 68. In accord 
with this principle, we reaffirm that judges 
may exercise sentencing discretion within 
those limits established by the legislature; 
the power to fix sentencing limits and the 
power to suspend sentence in favor of pro-
bation are not inherent in the judiciary but 
must be authorized by statute. Similarly, 
the power to revoke probation must be 
exercised within legislatively established 
limits. Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(10)(a) 
(Interim Supp.1984) is therefore not an un-
constitutional limitation on the sentencing 
power of the judiciary. 
[4] In light of the limits of judicial sen-
tencing power, we examine the statute to 
determine if the trial court exceeded its 
authority in revoking defendant's proba-
tion. Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 sets forth 
probation procedures in general. At the 
time this matter arose, section 77-18-
l(10)(a) stated: 
Upon completion without violation of 18 
months probation in felony or class A 
misdemeanor cases, cr six months in 
class B misdemeanor cases, the offender 
shall be terminated from sentence and 
the supervision of the Division of Correc-
tions, unless the person is earlier termi-
nated by the court. 
(Emphasis added.) Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-18-l(10)(a) (Interim Supp.1984).2 The 
statute requires that the offender "shall" 
be terminated from sentence if eighteen-
months' probation is completed without vio-
lation. This strong mandate is not consist-
ent with the State's position that the eigh-
teen-month term is "tolled" when any viola-
tion occurs within the period and that there 
2. The statute currently states: 
(7)(a) Upon completion without violation of 
18 months' probation in felony or class A 
misdemeanor cases, or six months in class B 
misdemeanor cases, the probation period 
shall be terminated, unless earlier terminated 
by the court. 
(b) The Department of Corrections shall no-
tify the sentencing court and prosecuting at-
torney in writing 45 days in advance in all 
cases where termination of supervision will 
occur by law. The notification shall include a 
probation progress report and complete re-
is no time limit for initiating a revocation 
action. 
The State's interpretation of the statute 
would create absurd results. Defendants 
would be left in a perpetual state of limbo; 
although their probation would appear to 
have been terminated, usually by entry of 
an order to that effect, defendants would 
actually be subject to a continued term of 
fictional supervision. This indefinite proba-
tionary term could theoretically be revoked 
many years after the original imposition 
and suspension of sentence. Decades could 
pass and then, based upon the discovery of 
a probation violation which had occurred 
during the statutory period, a court could 
revoke a term of probation thought to have 
been terminated long ago. This construc-
tion would obviate the certainty and regu-
larity created by the statute and ignore the 
plain meaning of the word "terminate." 
In In re Flint, 25 Utah 338, 71 P. 531 
(1903), this Court examined a trial court's 
jurisdictional limits after the trial court had 
indefinitely suspended a defendant's sen-
tence and discharged him from custody. 
This Court stated: "[W]e know of no rule 
or principle of law whereby a court can 
indefinitely suspend sentence, keep the de-
fendant in a state of suspense and uncer-
tainty, and, long after he has been dis-
charged from custody, have him rearrest-
ed, and impose a sentence of either fine or 
imprisonment on him." Id. at 341, 71 P. at 
531-32. We believe the same principle de-
feats the State's arguments regarding sec-
tion 77-18-l(10)(a). 
Many other states have addressed a 
question analogous to the one raised in this 
case, i.e., whether a trial court lacks juris-
diction to revoke or amend probation after 
port of details on outstanding fines and resti-
tution orders. 
(c) At any time prior to the termination of 
probation, upon a minimum of five days' no-
tice and a hearing or upon a waiver of the 
notice and hearing by the probationer, the 
court may extend probation for an additional 
term of 18 months in felony or class A misde-
meanors or six months in class B misdemean-
ors if fines or restitution or both are owing. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(7)(a) to (c) (Supp. 
1987). 
HENDERSON v. FOR-SHOR CO. 
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the judicially invoked probationary period 
expires. In State v. Gibson, 156 NJ.Su-
per. 516, 384 A.2d 178 (1978), the New 
Jersey Superior Court characterized the re-
sults reached by the courts of other states 
as follows: (1) probation may be revoked if 
the proceedings are initiated within a rea-
sonable time after the probationary term's 
expiration; (2) probation may be revoked if 
the proceedings are initiated within the 
probationary term;3 and (3) probation may 
be revoked only if the proceedings are com-
pleted within the probationary term. Id. at 
529-30, 384 A.2d at 184-85. None of these 
approaches has been used by a clear major-
ity of jurisdictions, and each appears to be 
largely a function of the statutory lan-
guage of each state. 
The State argues that terminating the 
court's jurisdiction simultaneously with the 
probation period will frustrate the public 
policy underlying probation, because a pro-
bationer who commits a violation has ig-
nored the obligations set forth in the proba-
tion agreement, has violated the trust asso-
ciated with probation, and has endangered 
the public. We agree that these concerns 
are valid; however, all but technical viola-
tions can be punished on their own merits, 
and the defendant's past record can be 
considered at that time. 
Moreover, the current amended version 
of section 77-18-1 does allow judges to 
avoid some of the problems that may arise 
under a fixed period of jurisdiction. Pursu-
ant to section 77-18-l(7)(c), a "court may 
extend probation for an additional term . . . 
if fines or restitution or both are owing." 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(7)(c) (Supp. 
1987). In the instant case, for example, 
defendant had not yet completed paying all 
of the restitution that he was ordered to 
pay, and under the current law, the trial 
court could have continued its jurisdiction 
over defendant for another eighteen-month 
term.4 
3. Because the revocation proceedings in this 
case were not initiated until after the statutory 
probation term had expired, we need not reach 
the issue of the retention of jurisdiction when 
proceedings have been initiated but not com-
pleted within the eighteen-month term. 
The trial court may also hold a hearing 
within the eighteen-month period, pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(9) (Supp. 
1987), to determine whether a defendant 
has violated the terms of his or her proba-
tion. If the court determines that proba-
tion violations have in fact occurred, proba-
tion may be "revoked, modified, [or] contin-
ued, or . . . the entire probation term [may] 
commence anew." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-18-l(9)(e) (Supp.1987). 
The trial court's order revoking proba-
tion and authorizing execution of defend-
ant's sentence is reversed. The case is 
remanded for entry of an order terminating 
custody. 
HALL, C.J., HOWE, Associate C.J., 
and STEWART and ZIMMERMAN, J J , 
concur. 
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Mitchell D. HENDERSON, Eileen But-
tars, Laurena B. Henderson, and David 
Hale, Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
v. 
FOR-SHOR COMPANY, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 870502-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
June 10, 1988. 
Owner of cement forms brought action 
for conversion based on their wrongful re-
possession. Owner's grandmother, on 
whose land forms had been stored, brought 
claim for trespass. Lessee of the forms 
brought suit for rental overcharge. The 
1st District Court, Cache County, Venoy 
4. Under the statute in effect at the time of 
defendant's probation period, the trial court was 
not specifically empowered to do so. 
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Michael O. SMITH, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
Gerald L. COOK, Warden, Utah State 
Prison; David R. Wilkinson, Utah State 
Attorney General, Defendants and Ap-
pellees. 
No. 890241. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Nov. 29, 1990. 
Probationer petitioned for writ of ha-
beas corpus when probation was revoked 
after probationary period expired. The 
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, Mi-
chael R. Murphy, J., granted warden's mo-
tion for judgment on pleadings. Probation-
er appealed. The Supreme Court, Hall, 
C.J., held that: (1) statute of limitations 
applicable to wrrit of habeas corpus pro-
ceeding was tolled by probationer's incar-
ceration; (2) amendment restricting length 
of time person can be placed on probation 
did not apply to probationer; and (3) trial 
court lacked authority to revoke probation 
after period of probation had expired where 
probationer was not served with order to 
show cause within probationary period. 
Writ of habeas corpus granted. 
Zimmerman, J., concurred in part, dis-
sented in part, and filed opinion in which 
Stewart, J., joined. 
1. Criminal Law <S=>1134(3) 
Supreme Court accords trial court's 
conclusions of law no particular deference 
but reviews them for correctness. 
2. Habeas Corpus <s=>689 
Statute of limitations for criminal de-
fendant's habeas corpus petition was tolled 
during petitioner's incarceration, even 
though petitioner suffered no actual dis-
ability during incarceration and habeas cor-
pus action was predicated on fact that peti-
tioner was incarcerated. U.C.A.1953, 78-
12-31.1, 78-12-36. 
3. Habeas Corpus <s=>689 
Any ambiguity existing in tolling pro-
visions of statute of limitations for bring-
ing habeas corpus actions should be re-
solved in favor of criminal defendant. U.C. 
A.1953, 78-12-31.1, 78-12-36. 
4. Criminal Law <s=*982.3, 982.9(1) 
Trial court's power to grant, modify, or 
revoke probation is purely statutory, and 
although trial court has discretion in these 
matters, trial court's discretion must be 
exercised within limits imposed by legisla-
ture. 
5. Statutes <®=>267(1) 
Statute is procedural or remedial rath-
er than substantive, for purposes of deter-
mining retroactive application of statute, if 
statute does not enlarge, eliminate, or de-
stroy vested rights. 
6. Criminal Law <s=982.2 
Amendment to statute which limited 
time criminal defendant could be placed on 
probation enlarged rights of probationers 
and, thus, amendment was substantive and 
could not be applied retroactively. U.C.A. 
1953, 77-18-l(10)(a)(1984); U.C.A. 1953, 68-
3-3. 
7. Criminal Law <S=>14, 1206.3(2) 
If amendment to statute, which in-
creases punishment for criminal offense, 
becomes effective prior to sentencing but 
after offense was committed, statute in 
effect at time offense was committed gov-
erns. U.C.A.1953, 68-3-5. 
8. Criminal Law <s=>14, 1206.3(2) 
When person has been sentenced un-
der criminal statute, that person has in-
curred penalty under statute and any 
amendment to statute that becomes effec-
tive after sentence has been imposed has 
no effect on that sentence. U.C.A.1953, 
68-3-5. 
9. Criminal Law <3=>982.2 
Punishment is incurred simply by plac-
ing criminal on probation, for purposes of 
determining applicability of amendment 
limiting time any criminal could be placed 
on probation, since probation places signifi-
cant restrictions on liberty of person, and 
SMITH 
Cite as 803 P.2d 
since trial court could impose fines, require 
restitution, and impose jail sentences as 
condition of probation. U.C.A.1953, 63-3-
5, 77-18-1. 
10. Criminal Law <£=>982.2 
Amendment which restricted length of 
time criminal could be placed on probation 
did not apply to habeas corpus petitioner, 
even though petitioner's probation was re-
voked after amendment imposing restric-
tion became effective, where no restriction 
existed when petitioner was sentenced to 
probation. U.C.A.1953, 68-3-5, 77-18-1. 
11. Criminal Law <s=>982.9(3) 
Trial court lacked authority to revoke 
criminal's probation where criminal was not 
given notice of revocation proceedings pri-
or to expiration of his probation period. 
U C.A.1953, 77-18-1. 
12. Criminal Law e=>982.9(3) 
Where probationer is not actively 
avoiding supervision, trial court retains au-
thority over probationer for proceeding to 
revoke probation when probationer is 
served with order to show cause within 
probationary period, even though revoca-
tion proceeding is not completed until after 
probationary period expires. U.C.A.1953, 
77-18-1. 
Anne Milne, M. David Eckersley, Salt 
Lake City, for plaintiff and appellant. 
R. Paul Van Dam, C. Dane Nolan, Salt 
Lake City, for defendants and appellees. 
HALL, Chief Justice: 
This is an appeal from the denial of a 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 
On June 23, 1981, plaintiff Michael 0. 
Smith was convicted of forcible sodomy 
upon a child,1 a first degree felony, and 
was sentenced to a prison term of five 
years to life. Formal judgment was en-
tered against Smith on July 10, 1981, at 
which time his prison sentence was sus-
pended subject to successful completion of 
v. COOK Utah 789 
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three years' probation. Three months prior 
to the completion of his probation, Smith 
was again arrested and charged with two 
counts of sexual abuse of a child and sod-
omy upon a child. In connection with these 
charges, on May 15, 1984, an incident re-
port and affidavit to show cause why 
Smith's 1981 probation should not be re-
voked or modified was filed in the third 
district court. On June 21, 1984, two days 
prior to the expiration of his probation, 
Smith pleaded guilty to two counts of at-
tempted forcible sexual abuse of a child,2 
two third degree felonies,3 and was subse-
quently sentenced to two consecutive pris-
on terms of zero to five years. 
On December 12, 1984, after the expira-
tion of Smith's original probation term, 
Judge David Dee of the third district court 
ordered him to show cause why his original 
probation should not be revoked or mod-
ified. A hearing was held pursuant to this 
order on December 14, 1984. Smith ap-
peared personally at the hearing and was 
represented by counsel At the conclusion 
of the hearing, Judge Dee ruled that Smith 
had violated his 1981 probation and im-
posed Smith's initial sentence of five years 
to life. No appeal was taken from that 
hearing. 
On June 22, 1987, approximately two and 
one-half years after the 1984 revocation 
hearing, Smith filed a petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus contesting the legality of his 
commitment pursuant to the sentence im-
posed at the 1984 relocation hearing. An 
amended petition was filed on April 20, 
1988. In his petition, Smith claimed that he 
was denied due process of law for lack of 
effective assistance of counsel at his revo-
cation hearing and that the district court 
lacked the jurisdiction to revoke his proba-
tion because his probation period had termi-
nated. Defendant Gerald R. Cook moved 
for a judgment on the pleadings on the 
grounds that the petition was barred by the 
applicable statute of limitations 4 and that 
Smith had failed to allege facts which dem-
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-403 (Supp.1981). 3. Utah Code Ann § 76-4-102 (Supp 1984) 
2. Utah Code Ann § 76-5-404 (Supp.1984). 4. Utah Code Ann § 78-12-31 1 (Supp 1987). 
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onstrated that (1) due process was violated 
in connection with Smith's revocation hear-
ing, and (2) an error at the hearing would 
have warranted an appeal of the order re-
voking probation. On May 10, 1989, the 
trial judge granted judgment on the plead-
ings for the reasons presented by Cook. 
[1] Two general issues are presented on 
this appeal. The threshold issue is whether 
Smith's two- and one-half-year delay in 
challenging the 1984 revocation hearing 
bars his petition for habeas corpus in light 
of Utah's three-month statute of limitations 
on habeas corpus petitions.5 If the petition 
is not barred, a second issue arises: wheth-
er the trial court was correct in dismissing 
Smith's petition on the pleadings. There is 
no dispute as to the underlying facts in this 
case. Rather, Smith argues that the trial 
court erred in its application of the law. 
We accord conclusions of law no particular 
deference but review them for correct-
ness.6 
I. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
Defendants contend that Smith's petition 
for habeas corpus is barred by Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-12-31.1 (Supp.1987). Section 
78-12-31.1 reads: "Within three months: 
For relief pursuant to a writ of habeas 
corpus. This limitation shall apply not only 
to grounds known to petitioner but also to 
grounds which in the exercise of reason-
able diligence should be known by petition-
er or counsel for petitioner." Defendants 
argue that both of the grounds Smith rais-
es in his petition are based on facts and law 
that Smith should have been aware of at 
the time of, or shortly after, his 1984 revo-
cation hearing. Therefore, Smith's two-
and one-half-year delay in filing his petition 
bars his petition for habeas corpus. 
In asserting that section 78-12-31.1 
should not apply in his case, Smith does not 
claim that prior to the filing of his petition 
he was unaware of the grounds underlying 
5. Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-31.1 (Supp.1987). 
6. Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 
(Utah 1985). 
7. The 1987 amendments to section 78-12-36 de-
leted the section which referred to the imprison-
his claims of error. Rather, he argues that 
(1) prior to 1987, any statute of limitations 
which would otherwise run against an indi-
vidual was tolled during the time in which 
that person was incarcerated, and (2) any 
attempt by the legislature to limit the time 
in which a void judgment could be attacked 
would violate article I, section 11 of the 
Utah Constitution. 
Smith's claim that the statute of limita-
tions for habeas corpus actions had been 
tolled is based on Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-12-36 (Supp.1977). Section 78-12-36, 
prior to being amended in 1987,7 read in 
pertinent part: 
If a person entitled to bring an action . . . 
is at the time the cause of action accrued 
either . . . imprisoned on a criminal 
charge, or in execution under the sen-
tence of a criminal court, . . . the time of 
the disability is not part of the time 
limited for the commencement of an ac-
tion. 
Defendants argue that section 78-12-36 
should not apply because Smith was never 
actually disabled as a result of his impris-
onment. Defendants further claim that the 
legal disability of incarceration should not 
apply to a habeas corpus action which is 
predicated on the fact that the plaintiff is 
incarcerated. 
[2] The contention that Smith is not en-
titled to the protection of section 78-12-36 
because he has not suffered any actual 
disability is contrary to the language of 
section 78-12-36. Section 78-12-36 makes 
no mention of a showing of an actual dis-
ability but clearly states that a statute of 
limitation should not run against a person 
who "is at the time the cause of action 
accrued either . . . imprisoned on a criminal 
charge, or in execution under the sentence 
of a criminal court." 8 Therefore, Smith 
did not need to allege that he suffered any 
ment as a disability. The amendments did not 
become effective, however, until April 27, 1987. 
See 1987 Laws of Utah ch. 19, § 6. 
8. Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-36 (1987). 
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particular disability as a result of his im-
prisonment. 
[3] Defendants' second argument, that 
the disability of incarceration should not 
apply to habeas corpus actions predicated 
on the fact that the petitioner is incarcerat-
ed,9 is also contrary to the clear language 
of section 78-12-36. Furthermore, any am-
biguity that may exist in sections 78-12-36 
and 78-12-31.1 should be resolved in favor 
of a criminal defendant.10 We therefore 
hold that plaintiff's habeas corpus petition 
was not barred by section 78-12-31.1. 
Since we have resolved this issue on statu-
tory grounds, we will not reach Smith's 
constitutional arguments.11 
II. TERMINATION OF PROBATION 
Smith's first claim of error is that the 
trial court lacked jurisdiction to revoke his 
probation. Smith bases this claim on two 
alternative theories: (1) Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-18-l(10)(a) (Supp.1984), which limits 
9. In a limited number of situations, the writ of 
habeas corpus may be available where no one is 
actually incarcerated. See 39 AmJur.2d Habeas 
Corpus §§ 91, 92 (1968). 
10. See generally Shelmidine v. Jones, 550 P.2d 
207, 211-12 (Utah 1976); State v. Tapp, 26 Utah 
2d 392, 490 P.2d 334, 336 n. 6 (1971). 
11. See State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960, 966 
(Utah 1989); Greaves v. State, 528 P.2d 805, 
806-07 (Utah 1974). Smith had argued that 
section 78-12-31.1 violated Utah Constitution 
article I, section 11. 
12. State v. Green, 757 P.2d 462, 464 (Utah 1988); 
see also State v. Cowdell, 626 P.2d 487, 488 
(Utah 1981). 
13. See State v. Green, 757 P.2d at 464; State v. 
Cowdell, 626 P.2d at 488. 
14. At the time Smith was placed on probation, 
the applicable statute, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-18-1 (Supp.1981), read in pertinent part: 
(1) On a plea of guilty or no contest or 
conviction of any crime or offense, if it ap-
pears compatible with the public interest, the 
court may suspend the imposition or execu-
tion of sentence and place the defendant on 
probation for such period of time as it deter-
mines 
(4) After hearing, the Court may increase 
or decrease the probation period and may 
v. COOK Utah 791 
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the time a court may place a person on 
probation to eighteen months, was applica-
ble to Smith at the time of his revocation 
hearing, and (2) under the express terms of 
his probation order, his probation terminat-
ed prior to the time the court obtained 
jurisdiction. 
A. Applicable Statute 
[4] The trial court's power to grant, 
modify, or revoke probation is purely statu-
tory, and although a trial court has discre-
tion in these matters, the court's discretion 
must be exercised within the limits imposed 
by the legislature.12 In the past, we have 
held that a trial court lacks jurisdiction to 
revoke probation when it acts outside the 
scope of its legislative authority.13 At the 
time Smith was placed on probation, Utah's 
probation statute, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-18-1 (Supp.1984), did not limit the 
length of time a person convicted of a 
felony could be placed on probation.14 Pri-
revoke or modify any condition of proba-
tion . . . 
(5)(a) Probation may not be revoked except 
upon a hearing in court and a finding that the 
conditions of probation have been violated. 
(b) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging 
with particularity facts asserted to constitute 
violation of the conditions of probation, the 
court which authorizes probation shall deter-
mine whether the affidavit establishes proba-
ble cause to believe that revocation or modifi-
cation of probation may be justified. If the 
court determines that there is probable cause, 
it shall cause to be served on the defendant a 
copy of the affidavit and an order to show 
cause why his probation should not be re-
voked or modified. 
(c) The order to show cause shall specify a 
time and place for the hearing, which shall be 
within seven days of the service upon the 
defendant unless he shows good cause for a 
continuance, and shall inform the defendant 
of a right to be represented by counsel at the 
hearing and to have counsel appointed for 
him if he is indigent. The order shall also 
inform the defendant of a right to present 
evidence as provided in the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
(e) After hearing, the Court shall make 
findings of fact. Upon determining that the 
defendant violated the conditions of proba-
tion, the court may order the probation re-
voked, modified or continued. If probation is 
revoked . . . the sentence previously imposed 
shall be executed. 
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or to Smith's revocation hearing, however, 
the legislature amended section 77-18-1, 
limiting the time a person convicted of a 
felony can be placed on probation to eigh-
teen months.15 Smith claims that even 
though he was placed on probation under 
the 1981 statute, the 1984 statute should 
apply to his case because it was in effect at 
the time of his revocation hearing. We 
disagree with this contention and hold that 
the 1984 statute does not apply to this case. 
[5, 6] Initially, it should be noted that 
under traditional statutory analysis, the 
1984 amendments should not apply retroac-
tively. Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-3 (Supp. 
1984) provides that "no part of these re-
vised statutes is retroactive, unless ex-
pressly so declared." The amendments to 
section 77-18-1 did not expressly state that 
they should be applied retroactively.16 
There is, however, an exception to the rule 
of non-re troactivity, set out in section 68-
3-3, for statutes that are procedural or 
remedial in nature.17 A statute is con-
sidered procedural or remedial, as opposed 
to substantive, if the statute does not en-
large, eliminate, or destroy vested rights.18 
The amendment in question, section 77-18-
l(10)(a) (Supp.1984), limits the time a per-
son can be placed on probation, thereby 
enlarging the rights of an individual who is 
15. Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(10)(a) (Supp. 
1984) reads: "Upon completion without viola-
tion of 18 months' probation in felony or class A 
misdemeanor cases, or six months in class B 
misdemeanor cases, the offender shall be termi-
nated from sentence and the supervision of the 
Division of Corrections, unless the person is 
earlier terminated by the court." In 1989, the 
Utah legislature again amended section 77-18-1 
to allow a probationary period of thirty-six 
months. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(7)(a) 
(Supp.1989). 
16. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (Supp.1984). 
17. See State v. Norton, 675 P.2d 577, 585 (Utah 
1983) (overruled on different grounds by State 
v. Hansen, 734 P.2d 421, 427 (Utah 1986)). In 
Norton, the court held that an amendment to 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207(4) which estab-
lished new procedures to be followed when an 
appellate court holds that errors had been com-
mitted in the sentencing procedure in a capital 
case was purely procedural in nature and there-
fore should be applied retroactively. 
placed on probation. The amendment is 
therefore substantive and, pursuant to sec-
tion 68-3-3, should not apply retroactively. 
Plaintiff contends, however, that there 
are additional considerations involved with 
amendments that lessen the penalty for 
criminal offenses. He cites a line of cases 
which hold that when a statute is amended 
to lessen the penalty for a criminal offense, 
a person convicted of the offense is entitled 
to the lesser penalty if the amendment 
becomes effective prior to the time the 
person is sentenced.19 He argues that this 
rule supports the contention that individu-
als who are placed on probation are entitled 
to the benefit of any statutory amendments 
that become effective prior to their revoca-
tion hearings. His reliance on these cases, 
however, is misplaced. 
[7,8] The rule set out in the cases cited 
by plaintiff is applicable only to situations 
in which the amendment that lessens the 
criminal penalty becomes effective prior to 
the time a criminal defendant is sen-
tenced.20 We have consistently held that in 
such situations, "the law in force at the 
time of sentencing govern[s] and . . . that 
an amendment to [a] statute passed after 
sentence has no effect on the matter." 21 
This approach is based on Utah Code Ann. 
§ 68-3-5 (Supp.1984), which states, "[The] 
18. See State v. Norton, 675 P.2d at 585; Depart-
ment of Social Servs. v. Higgs, 656 P.2d 998, 
1000 (Utah 1982). 
19. See Shelmidine v. Jones, 550 P.2d 207, 211-12 
(Utah 1976); State v. Tapp, 26 Utah 2d 392, 490 
P.2d 334, 335-36 (1971); Belt v. Turner, 25 Utah 
2d 380, 483 P.2d 425, 425-26 (1971). 
20. If, however, an amendment which increases 
the punishment for a criminal offense becomes 
effective prior to sentencing but after the of-
fense was committed, the statute in effect at the 
time the offense was committed will govern to 
avoid constitutional questions concerning the ex 
post facto clause of the United States Constitu-
tion or the Utah Constitution. See Belt v. Turn-
er, 483 P.2d at 426; U.S. Const, art. I., § 9; Utah 
Const, art. I., § 18. 
21. Harris v. Smith, 541 P.2d 343, 344 (Utah 
1975) (emphasis in original); see also State v. 
Tapp, 490 P.2d at 336; Belt v. Turner, 483 P.2d 
at 426; State v. Miller, 24 Utah 2d 1, 464 P.2d 
844, 846 (1970). 
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repeal of a statute does not revive a statute 
previously repealed, or affect any right 
which has accrued, any duty imposed, any 
penalty incurred, or any action or proceed-
ing commenced under or by virtue of the 
statute repealed." When a person has 
been sentenced under a statute, that per-
son has incurred a penalty under the stat-
ute; therefore, pursuant to section 68-3-5, 
any amendment to the statute that be-
comes effective after a sentence has been 
imposed has no effect on that sentence. 
[9,10] In the instant case, in 1981, 
plaintiff was convicted and sentenced, and 
pursuant to section 77-18-1(1) (Supp.1981), 
his sentence was suspended and he was 
placed on probation. The fact that he was 
placed on probation does not affect the fact 
that in 1981 he had "incurred a punish-
ment" within the meaning of section 63-3-
5. The term "punishment" in section 63-
3-5 should be interpreted in accord with its 
usual and accepted meaning.22 This being 
the case, it is unnecessary to determine 
whether a person who has been placed on 
probation incurs the punishment set out in 
the sentence prior to the time probation is 
revoked, because it is clear that simply by 
being placed on probation, punishment is 
incurred. The general nature of probation 
places significant restrictions on the liberty 
of the person placed on probation.23 The 
penal quality of probation is also clear 
from section 77-18-1(4) (Supp.1981), which 
states that as a condition of probation the 
trial court can impose fines, require restitu-
tion, and impose jail sentences. When 
Smith was placed on probation on terms 
that were consistent with section 77-18-1 
(Supp.1981), he incurred a punishment; 
therefore, under the terms of section 63-
3-5 and the cases cited by Smith, any sub-
sequent amendment to section 77-18-1 
would have no effect on the terms of his 
probation. 
Thus, the trial court was correct in re-
fusing to apply section 77-18-1 (Supp.1984) 
in the instant case and in holding that 
22. Utah County v. Orem City, 699 P.2d 707, 709 24. 757 P.2d 462 (Utah 1988). 
(Utah 1985). 
23. See State v. Cowdell, 626 P.2d at 489. 2 5 ' Id a t 4 6 4 ~ 6 5 
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Smith's probation had not automatically 
terminated after he spent eighteen months 
on probation without a probation violation. 
B. Court's Authority 
[11] Plaintiffs second argument is that 
the district court had no authority to re-
voke his probation because, by the express 
terms of his probation order, his probation 
terminated prior to the time revocation pro-
ceedings were initiated. We agree with 
this contention and hold that under the 
statute applicable to Smith's case, the trial 
fflnrt ]acked the authority to revoke 
Smith's probation because Smith was not 
given notice of the revocation proceedings 
prior to the expiration of his probation. 
Plaintiffs argument is based on our deci-
sion in State v. Green,2* where we held 
that, pursuant to section 77-18-1 (Supp. 
1984), a trial court lacks the authority to 
revoke probation after the expiration of a 
statutorily imposed eighteen-month proba-
tion period even if the violation occurred 
during the probation period.25 
A related issue is now before this court: 
whether probation can be revoked when 
the revocation proceeding had been argu-
ably initiated but not completed before the 
expiration of a judicially imposed probation 
period. Although Green involved a defen-
dant who was placed on probation pursuant 
to section 77-18-1 (Supp 1984) and the deci-
sion was based in part on the language of 
the 1984 statute, the holding in Green is 
applicable to the instant case. In Green, 
we rejected an interpretation of section 77-
18-1 (Supp 1984) that would allow for a 
tolling of the probation period after the 
commission of a probation violation. In 
doing so, we reasoned that such an inter-
pretation would be improper because it 
would place individuals who have been 
placed on probation "in a perpetual state of 
limbo; although their probation would ap-
pear to have terminated .. [the] defen-
dants would actually be subject to a contin-
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ued term of fictional supervision." 2fi The 
court found support for this contention in 
our case law decided prior to the enactment 
of section 77-18-1 (Supp.1984).27 
Nothing in section 77-18-1 (Supp.1981) is 
contrary to the position asserted in Green. 
It is true that section 77-18-1 (Supp.1981), 
unlike section 77-18-1 (Supp.1984), does 
not include language stating that probation 
will "terminate" after a certain period. 
However, section 77-18-1(4) (Supp.1981) 
states that the district courts do not have 
the authority to extend a period of proba-
tion without a hearing conducted pursuant 
to the procedures set out in section 77-18-
1(5) (Supp.1981).28 This language is con-
sistent with the assertion that without such 
a hearing, the trial court does not have the 
authority to extend the period of supervi-
sion beyond the original period of proba-
tion. 
Defendants, however, contend that the 
instant case is distinguishable from Green 
in that Smith's revocation proceedings were 
initiated during his period of probation. In 
Green, we expressly reserved the question 
of whether the trial court retains its au-
thority to revoke probation in situations 
where the revocation proceedings are initi-
ated but not completed within the probation 
period.29 There are jurisdictions where it is 
necessary to complete the revocation pro-
cess within the probationary period in order 
for the trial court to retain its authority to 
26. Id. at 464. 
27. Id. (citing In re Flint, 25 Utah 338, 71 P. 531 
(1903)). 
28. See supra note 12. 
29. State v. Green, at 465 n. 3. 
30. See State v. Jones, 285 So.2d 231, 233-34 
(IAA97SV, In re Grijjin, 67 CaUd 343, 431 P.ld 
625, 627, 62 Cal.Rptr. 1 (1967); Brooker v. State, 
207 So.2d 478 (Fla.Ct.App. 1968). In Green, we 
noted that other jurisdictions that have ad-
dressed this problem have followed one of three 
approaches: probation may be revoked if revo-
cation proceedings are (1) initiated within a 
reasonable time after the probation period, (2) 
initiated within the probation period, or (3) 
completed within the revocation period. We 
went on to state, "None of these approaches has 
been used by a clear majority of jurisdictions, 
and each appears to be largely a function of the 
revoke an individual's probation.30 The jur-
isdictions which follow that rule, however, 
do so largely as a matter of statutory con-
struction.31 There is nothing in the Utah 
statute, section 77-18-1 (Supp.1981), which 
compels the conclusion that the revocation 
proceedings must be complete as opposed 
to initiated, within the proh .ion period.32 
Furthermore, as discussed below, the con-
cerns over the extension of the period of 
supervision which were relied on in Green 
are not implicated in a situation where the 
revocation proceedings are properly initi-
ated. Without any statutory or policy con-
siderations to the contrary, we see no rea-
son to limit a trial court's authority to 
revoke or modify probation. 
This conclusion leads to a second issue: 
which stage in the revocation proceedings 
must be reached within the period of proba-
tion for the court to retain its authority 
over probationers beyond the probation pe-
riod, k xe i^e^v oi the Te\evaiit statutes and 
case law leads us to the conclusion thatjn^ 
prder for fl "*»»•{
 r n rfj^n its authority 
over a probationer who is not actively evad-
ing supervision, the probationer must be 
served with the order to show cause withm 
the period of probation. 
[12] The jurisdictions that have con-
sidered this issue have not followed a uni-
form approach.33 Rather, the positions 
taken by the various states are largely 
dependent on each state's individual proba-
statutory language of each state." State v. 
Green, 757 P.2d at 465. 
31. See State v. Jones, 285 So.2d at 233-34; In re 
Griffin, 431 P.2d at 627; Brooker v. State, 207 
So.2d at 480. 
32. See supra note 12. 
33. Some jurisdictions hold that a court retains 
its authority over probationers if a report of a 
probation violation is filed with the court within 
the probation period, see Barthiume v. State, 
549 P.2d 366, 367 (Okla.Crim.App.1976); others 
hold that it is necessary for the court to issue an 
order to show cause or an arrest warrant, see 
State v. O'Neal, 24 Or.App. 423, 545 P.2d 910, 
911 (Or.Ct.App.1976); and other jurisdictions 
hold that the warrant needs to be executed be-
fore the court can retain its authority to revoke 
probation past the probation period, see State v. 
Jones, 285 So.2d 231, 233-34 (La. 1973). 
SMITH 
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tion statute.'"*4 The Utah statute, section 
77-18-1 (Supp.1981), does not explicitly 
deal with this issue. However, section 77-
18-1 (Supp.1981) does place a significant 
amount of emphasis on the nature and de-
gree of notice to which an individual is 
entitled prior to a revocation hearing. Sec-
tion 77-18-l(5)(b) and (c) (Supp.1981) not 
only states that a court "shall cause to be 
served on the defendant a copy of the 
affidavit and order to show cause/' but 
also provides that the order to show cause 
shall inform the defendant of the nature of 
the accusations against him, his right to 
counsel, and his right to present evidence.35 
The emphasis on notice in section 77-18-1 
(Supp.1981) is consistent with the assertion 
that a court retains the authority to revoke 
probation if the probationer is served with 
notice of the revocation proceedings within 
the probation period. 
The assertion that a probationer is enti-
tled to notice within the period of probation 
in order for the court to retain the authori-
ty to revoke probation is consistent with 
the rationale underlying- our decision in 
Green^ If probationers are given notice 
within the probation period, there is no 
danger of placing them "in a state of per-
petual limbo[, where] although their proba-
tion would appear to have terminated . . . 
defendants would actually be subject to a 
continued term of fictional supervision/'36 
Under such an approach, all parties con-
cerned would be aware of the proceedings 
and the allegations underlying the proceed-
ings at the time the probation terminates. 
Probationers could also be assured that no 
new proceedings or proceedings under dif-
ferent grounds could be brought against 
them once the probation period has ended.37 
Therefore, probationers would not be in a 
state of limbo where it would appear that 
their probation had terminated but where 
34. See State v. O'Neal, 545 P.2d at 911; State v. 
Jones, 285 So.2d r 233-34. 
35. See supra no 12. 
36. State v. Green, 757 P.2d at 464. 
37. See State v. Cowdell, 626 P.2d at 487-89 
(holding that a court cannot revoke probation 
°n grounds different than those in the order to 
show cause). 
v. COOK Utah 795 
788 (Utah 1990) 
further proceedings could be brought 
against them. However, if a trial court 
was able to retain the authority to revoke 
probation without giving notice to the pro-
bationer, there may be situations in which 
it could appear that the probation had end-
ed when in fact the court may, at some 
later date, reassert its jurisdiction over the 
defendant for the purpose of revoking pro-
bation. 
Such an approach is also in accord with 
the decisions of this court, as well as the 
Ihited States Supreme Court, holding that 
thajrrixr^*** nf thpftindamental fairness 
embodied in the due process Hanse nf the 
United States Constitution entitle proha-
tioners to written notice of the accusations 
a^inst them prior to their revocation hear-
ings.38 This approach is also consistent 
with the general rule that in order for a 
court to obtain jurisdiction over a civil de-
fendant, the defendant must be properly 
served in the manner required by law.39 
Moreover, there should be no practical 
problem with serving probationers because, 
due to the nature of probation, they are 
already under the supervision of the state. 
A different rule may need to be followed in 
some situations, such as where the proba-
tioner is actively avoiding service or is 
evading the supervision of the probation 
authorities or when the violation is commit-
ted so close to the termination of probation 
that it would be impractical or impossible 
for the probationer to receive notice within 
the period of probation. This question, 
however, is not presently before the court; 
therefore, we do not reach this issue. We 
hold that in situations where the probation-
er is not actively avoiding supervision, in 
order for a trial court to retain its authori-
ty over the probationer beyond the period 
of probation, the probationer must be 
38. Gagon v. Scarpelli, 41.1 U.S. 778, 786, 93 S.Ct. 
1756, 1761-62, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973); State v. 
Cowdell, 626 P.2d at 488. ~* ~ 
39. See Carlson v. Bos, 740 P.2d 1269, 1271 (Utah 
1987); Bawden & Assoc, v. Smith, 624 P.2d 676, 
677 (Utah 1981); 20 Am.Jur.2d Courts § 143, 
144 (1965). 
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served with an order to show cause within 
the probationary period.10 
It is undisputed that plaintiff was not 
given notice of the revocation proceedings 
within his probation period. Furthermore, 
it has not been claimed that he was avoid-
ing the supervision of probation authori-
ties. The trial court, therefore, did not 
have authority to revoke Smith's probation. 
Since we find for Smith on his first claim, 
we will not reach his other arguments. 
This case is remanded to the trial court 
with the direction to grant plaintiffs peti-
tion for habeas corpus. 
HOWE, Associate C.J, and ORME, 
Court of Appeals Judge, concur. 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice (concurring in 
the result in part and dissenting in part). 
I concur in the result in part I of the 
Chief Justice's opinion because I do not 
think the legislature can validly impose a 
three-month limitation period on habeas 
corpus actions. See Utah Const, art. I, 
§§ 5, 11; see also Condemarin v. Univer-
sity Hosp., 775 P.2d 348, 366-69 (Utah 
1989) (Zimmerman, J., concurring in part); 
Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 
670, 675 (Utah 1985). I dissent, however, 
from part IIA. Since a majority of the 
court joins the Chief Justice on part IIA, I 
agree that plaintiff Smith is entitled to the 
writ on the ground set forth in part IIB of 
the Chief Justice's opinion. 
Section 77~18-l(10)(a) provided, "Upon 
completion without violation of 18 months 
probation in felony . . . cases, . . . the of-
fender shall be terminated from [proba-
tion]." Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(10)(a) 
(Supp.1984) (current version at Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-18-l(7)(a) (1990)). The Chief 
Justice avoids applying this provision to 
Smith by reasoning that to give Smith the 
benefit of the section would be to apply it 
retroactively, back to the date of his initial 
40. The holding in this case is applicable to pro-
bationers who have been placed on probation 
under section 77-18-1 (Supp.1981). Subsequent 
amendments to section 77-18-1 may affect the 
authority of the trial court to revoke probation 
after the probation period has terminated. The 
present probation statute, section 77-18-1 (8)(b) 
sentencing. I cannot agree that any retro-
active application is necessary. On the 
date section 77-18-l(10)(a) became effec-
tive, long before Smith's probation revoca-
tion proceeding was initiated, Smith had 
served well over eighteen months without 
violation. By its plain terms, the statute 
operated to end his probation, and the pro-
bation of all other similarly situated proba-
tioners, forthwith. The statute stated that 
"[u]pon completion without violation of 18 
months' probation," the offender's proba-
tion is to be terminated. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-18-l(10)(a) (Supp.1984). There is no 
reference here to when the probationer was 
sentenced. It simply cuts off all proba-
tions after a fixed period if they have 
served the requisite period of time without 
violation. 
The Chief Justice's opinion may keep 
more people subject to parole revocation, 
but to reach that end, the majority has had 
to ignore both legislative intent and equity. 
First, the interpretation given the statute 
appears contrary to the legislature's pur-
pose in enacting it. We are informed that 
the legislature passed this section as a cost-
saving measure for the purpose of reliev-
ing the Department of Corrections of the 
burden of continuing to provide parole su-
pervision for those who have been trouble-
free for eighteen months. There is nothing 
in the statute to indicate that the legisla-
ture thought this cost-saving statute would 
operate only on those convicts put on pro-
bation from the effective date of the stat-
ute forward. In fact, its language sug-
gests the contrary. 
Second, the Chief Justice's interpretation 
creates a disparity in treatment of proba-
tioners that seems irrational. Persons put 
on probation immediately before section 
77-18-l(10)(a)'s passage may remain on 
probation for years, subject to revocation 
for infractions of the conditions of their 
probation. On the other hand, those con-
victed of the same crimes immediately af-
(Supp.1990), for instance, reads, "The running 
of the probation period is tolled upon the filing 
of a violation report with the court alleging a 
violation of the terms and conditions of proba-
tion or upon the issuance of an order to show 
cause or warrant by the court." 
SMITH v. COOK Utah 797 
Cite as 803 P.2d 788 (Utah 1990) 
ter the statute's passage need behave for DURHAM, J., having disqualified 
only eighteen months to escape probation, herself, does not participate herein; 
Yet they are no less or no more dangerous ORME, Court of Appeals Judge, sat. 
to the public than those still on probation, 
in the eyes of either the public or the 
judges who sentenced them. I would not 
interpret this statute to create such an 
anomaly. 
STEWART, J., concurs in the 
concurring and dissenting opinion of 
ZIMMERMAN, J. 
TabD 
Id hold that Lopes was not denied any ceedings prior 
H mental rights. I would affirm. had actual noti 
K38 Chief Justice HOWE concurs in Jus-
tice RUSSON'S dissenting opinion. 
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to that date, as probationer 
notice that his term of probation 
would not expire at conclusion of statutory 
36-month period. U.C.A.1953, 77-18-
K12)(a)(i). 
Co I KEY NUMBER SYSTEM > 
1999 UT 42 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Leslie J. CALL, Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 980047. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
April 30, 1999. 
The District Court, Salt Lake Division, 
Frank G. Noel, J., revoked probationer's pro-
bation for violation occurring after probation 
had been extended. Probationer appealed. 
The Court of Appeals certified case. The 
Supreme Court, Howe, C.J., held that: (1) 
probation was properly extended by proba-
tioner's agreement to one-year extension and 
waiver of personal appearance well before 
expiration date, and (2) waiver was knowing-
ly, voluntarily and intelligently made. 
Affirmed. 
1. Criminal Law <®=>982.7 
To extend probationary period beyond 
its original term, State must take definitive 
action to extend term before the expiration 
date, and probationer must be given notice of 
that intent. U.C.A.1953, 77-18-1 (12)(a)(i). 
2. Criminal Law <3=>982.7 
Probation was properly extended by 
probationer's agreement to one-year exten-
sion and waiver of personal appearance on 
extension well before expiration date, even 
though State did not initiate extension pro-
1- The parties disagree on the date when Call's 
probation began Call asserts that it began on 
April 3, 1992, the day the court orally sentenced 
"»m. The State, however, relies on State v. 
3. Criminal Law <s>982.7 
Probationer knowingly, intelligently, and 
voluntarily waived his right to hearing on 
issue of whether his probation should be 
extended by signing waiver form that in-
formed him of his right to appear and to be 
represented by counsel, as defendant was 
competent, read from, able to read form, and 
had reasonable understanding of proceed-
ings. U.C.A.1953, 77-18-l(12)(a)(i). 
Jan Graham, Att'y Gen., Barnard N. Mad-
sen, Asst. Att'y Gen., Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiff. 
Joan C. Watt, Scott C. Williams, Salt Lake 
City, for defendant. 
HOWE, Chief Justice: 
% 1 Defendant Leslie J. Call appealed to 
the Utah Court of Appeals from a district 
court order revoking his probation and or-
dering him to serve his sentence of two con-
current prison terms. However, after oral 
argument, but before rendering a decision, 
the court of appeals certified it to us pursu-
ant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(3) and rule 
43 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
BACKGROUND 
1f 2 On November 15, 1991, Call pleaded 
guilty to one count of burglary and one count 
of attempted forcible sexual abuse, both third 
degree felonies. The trial court sentenced 
him to serve two concurrent terms of zero to 
five years in prison but then suspended his 
sentence and placed him on probation for a 
period of three years. Although the court 
orally sentenced Call on April 3, 1992, it did 
not enter the written judgment and sentence 
until April 8,1992.1 
Anderson, 797 P.2d 1114 (Utah Ct.App.1990), to 
argue that Call's probationary period did not 
begin until April 8, 1992, the day the court 
signed and entered the written judgment. 
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1f 3 One of the terms of Call's probation 
required him to enter and complete a sex 
offender treatment program. He entered 
such a program but was unable to complete it 
by April 1995 when his probation would have 
initially terminated. On March 20, 1995, at 
the request of his probation officer, Call 
signed a "Waiver of Personal Appearance 
Before the Court," wherein he waived his 
right to a hearing and agreed to extend his 
probation for one more year so that he could 
complete his treatment program. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-18-l(12)(a)(i). On April 5, 
1995, the Utah State Department of Correc-
tions, Adult Probation and Parole ("AP & P") 
filed the signed waiver and a progress/viola-
tion report with the trial court and formally 
requested a one-year extension of Call's pro-
bation. The court granted the extension that 
same day. 
U4 Shortly after the extension of Call's 
probation, AP & P filed a second progress/vi-
olation report with the court which alleged 
that Call had been arrested and charged with 
residential burglary, criminal mischief, and 
assault. These charges arose from an inci-
dent in which Call allegedly broke into his 
ex-girlfriend's home, smashed several pieces 
of property, and physically assaulted her 
thirteen-year-old son. On April 28, 1995, the 
court revoked Call's probation but then rein-
stated it for another year with additional 
conditions. 
1f 5 On March 28, 1996, AP & P filed a 
third progress/violation report with the court. 
Although the report alleged that Call had 
violated his probation by failing to enter 
aftercare for the purpose of monitoring his 
ingestion of antabuse, failing to report to AP 
& P for one month, resuming to live with his 
ex-girlfriend, and consuming alcohol, it did 
not seek a revocation of his probation. Rath-
er, the report requested a second extension 
of Call's probation so that he could complete 
his sex offender treatment program. In ad-
dition to the progress/violation report, AP & 
P filed a waiver of personal appearance that 
Call had signed, wherein he again waived his 
right to a hearing and requested another 
extension of his probation. The court grant-
ed the request and extended Call's probation 
for one more year. 
11 6 In July 1996, AP & P filed a fourth 
progress/violation report with the court 
This report alleged that Call had been ar-
rested and charged with sexual abuse of a 
child, intoxication, and interfering with an 
arresting officer. The victim's father had 
reported to police that he found Call naked 
from the waist down and in bed with the two-
year-old victim. In light of these allegations 
the court issued a bench warrant and an 
order to show cause, ordering Call to appear 
and show why his probation should not be 
revoked. 
117 While the hearing on the order to 
show cause was pending, Call moved to dis-
miss. He asserted for the first time that the 
court's "jurisdiction over [his] case terminat-
ed on April 3, 1995," two days before AP & p 
sought to extend it the first time by filing the 
progress/violation report and signed waiver 
of personal appearance with the court on 
April 5, 1995. He maintained that the court 
therefore lacked the authority to revoke his 
probation and that the court should dismiss 
the pending revocation proceedings. The tri-
al court denied the motion and ultimately 
revoked Call's probation on December 11, 
1996. Call now appeals. 
118 Call contends that "[p]ursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (Supp.1996), felo-
ny probation terminates by [operation of] law 
after 36 months unless the probation period 
is tolled or the trial court acts to extend 
probation during the probation period." He 
relies on the following subsections, which 
provide in relevant part: 
(10)(a)(i) Probation may be terminated 
at any time at the discretion of the court 
or upon completion without violation of 36 
months [of] probation.... 
(ll)(b) The running of the probation pe-
riod is tolled upon the filing of a violation 
report with the court alleging a violation of 
the terms and conditions of probation or 
upon the issuance of an order to show 
cause or warrant by the court. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(10)(a)(i) & 
(ll)(b). Call argues that since AP & P failed 
to file the progress/violation report or other-
wise initiate the extension proceedings prior 
STATE 
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April 3,1^95, his probation period was not 
lied, but terminated as a matter of law. 
He also contends that he did not "knowingly, 
intelligently and voluntarily waive his right 
to a hearing on the issue of whether [his] 
probation should be extended." He thus 
concludes that even if AP & P had filed the 
waiver and progress/violation report before 
his probation terminated, the waiver was 
nevertheless ineffective in extending his pro-
bation. We will consider these two conten-
tions in order. 
ANALYSIS 
1f 9 Over the past eleven years, we have 
had occasion to decide two significant cases 
dealing with the termination of probation. 
In the first case, State v. Green, 757 P.2d 462 
(Utah 1988), we held that the trial court did 
not have authority to revoke a defendant's 
probation after the probationary period had 
expired by operation of law pursuant to sec-
tion 77-18-l(10)(a), which at that time pro-
vided for automatic termination of probation 
after eighteen months with no probation vio-
lation. In that case, after the eighteen-
month probationary period had expired, a 
probation officer discovered that the defen-
dant was being charged with committing 
three offenses during the eighteen-month 
statutory term of his probation. The officer 
filed an affidavit of probation violation with 
the trial court, and after a hearing, the court 
ordered the defendant to serve a prison term 
for his original conviction. We reversed the 
order sending him to prison and pointed out 
the indefiniteness the trial court's ruling cre-
ated: 
Defendants would be left in a perpetual 
state of limbo; although their probation 
would appear to have been terminated, 
usually by entry of an order to that effect, 
defendants would actually be subject to a 
continued term of fictional supervision 
Decades could pass and then, based upon 
the discovery of a probation violation 
which had occurred during the statutory 
period, a court could revoke a term of 
probation thought to have been terminated 
long ago. 
Jd at 464. 
UlO Two years later, in Smith v. Cook, 
803 P.2d 788 (Utah 1990), the defendant was 
v. CALL Utah 203 
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on probation for a three-year period, starting 
on July 10, 1981, and ending July 9, 1984. 
Three months prior to the completion of his 
probation, the defendant was again arrested 
and charged with a crime. On May 15, 1984, 
an incident report and affidavit to show cause 
why his 1981 probation should not be re-
voked or modified was filed in the district 
court. Five months later, in December 1984, 
the court revoked his probation and ordered 
him to serve his sentence. We reversed the 
revocation, holding that in order for a trial 
court to retain its authority over the proba-
tioner beyond the period of probation, the 
probationer must be served with an order to 
show cause within the probationary period. 
See Smith, 803 P.2d at 796. 
[1,2] 1111 These cases instruct that if it 
is the intent of the State to extend the proba-
tionary period beyond its original term, the 
State must take definitive action to extend 
the term before the expiration date, and the 
probationer must be given notice of that 
intent. Otherwise, the probationer is left in 
a state of uncertainty, not knowing whether 
to continue to observe the terms of his pro-
bation. In the instant case, a probation offi-
cer approached Call well in advance of the 
termination date and requested that he agree 
to a one-year extension of his probation so 
that he could complete the sex offender 
treatment program in which he was enrolled, 
thus fulfilling one of the terms of his proba-
tion. On March 20, 1995, Call signed a waiv-
er of personal appearance, wherein he waived 
his right to a hearing and agreed to an 
extension of his probation for one more year. 
This action confirmed that Call received actu-
al notice that his term of probation would not 
expire at the conclusion of the statutory 36-
month period. Thus Call's probation was 
properly extended under section 77-18-
l(12)(a)(i), which provides: "Probation may 
not be modified or extended except upon 
waiver of a hearing by the probationer or 
upon a hearing and a finding in court that 
the probationer has violated the conditions of 
probation." (Emphasis added.) 
1112 We conclude that Call acted to ex-
tend his probation for one year well in ad-
vance of the expiration of the original term 
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and left him with no doubt that he remained 
obligated to the terms of his probation for 
another year. See State v. Martin, 976 P.2d 
1224 (Utah Ct.App.1999) (holding that under 
section 77-18-1 (12)(a)(i), probation may be 
extended in either of two ways provided for 
in that subsection). Since Call signed the 
written waiver well before both April 3, 1995, 
and April 8, 1995, it is immaterial for the 
purposes of this case on which of those two 
dates his original term of probation would 
have expired. 
[3] 1113 Call also contends that he did 
not "knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily 
waive his right to counsel, notice and a hear-
ing on the extension issue." He has admit-
ted, however, that he signed the waiver and 
that he was competent and able to read the 
words on the form before he signed it. Call 
did not testify at the hearing on his motion to 
dismiss the order to show cause why his 
probation should be revoked. The record on 
this issue consists solely of the uncontradict-
ed testimony of his probation officer and the 
written waiver. 
1f 14 The probation officer testified that 
on March 20, 1995, he met with Call and 
discussed the probation conditions Call had 
not met and the possibility of an extension. 
Call did not object to extending his probation 
and did not ask for an attorney before mak-
ing that decision. He read the waiver form 
and asked no questions before he signed it. 
The form stated that Call was willing to 
accept the extension of his probation without 
a hearing and acknowledged his right to be 
present at a hearing and to be represented 
by counsel. In State v. Byington, 936 P.2d 
1112, 1116 (Utah Ct.App.1997), the court held 
that a probationer in a probation revocation 
hearing can waive the right to counsel "as 
long as the record as a whole reflects the 
probationer's reasonable understanding of 
the proceedings and awareness of the right 
to counsel." Under that standard, the writ-
ten waiver corroborated by both the proba-
tion officer's testimony and Call's admission 
established that Call had a reasonable under-
standing of the proceedings and an aware-
ness of his right to counsel. In denying 
Call's motion to dismiss, the trial court deter-
mined that Call knew what he was signing, 
was competent, and understood and could 
read the document that he signed. The trial 
court did not err in this regard. 
U 15 We conclude that the record fully 
supports that Call knowingly, intelligently, 
and voluntarily waived his right to a hearing 
on the issue of whether his probation should 
be extended. This conclusion is bolstered by 
the fact that one year later, in March 1996, 
Call again executed a "Waiver of Personal 
Appearance Before the Court" and requested 
another extension of his probation. 
IT 16 Order affirmed. 
1117 Associate Chief Justice DURHAM, 
Justice STEWART, Justice ZIMMERMAN, 
and Justice RUSSON concur in Chief Justice 
HOWE'S opinion. 
(o | KEY NUMBER SYSTEM > 
1999 UT 50 
STARWAYS, INC., Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Wesley D. CURRY and Bobbi Chase, aka 
Roberta A Chase, dba Curry & Chase 
Marketing, Defendants and Appellants. 
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Nevada corporation which had its princi-
pal place of business in Utah brought suit 
against California residents doing business in 
California for libel and intentional interfer-
ence with existing and prospective business 
advantage. California residents moved to dis-
miss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The 
Fourth District Court, Utah County, Fred D. 
Howard, J., denied motion, and California 
residents took interlocutory appeal. The Su-
preme Court, Durham, Associate Chief 
Judge, held that: (1) defendants failed to 
specifically controvert jurisdictional allega-
tions of complaint; (2) complaint allegations 
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PROTECTED 
PROGRESS/VIOLATION REPORT .,„ 
— S i . 
'• \LT LAKE COWTY 
fO: 3RD DISTRICT -
Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, Utah. 
tfTN: Judge Timothy R. Hanson 
.ROM: Salt Lake AP&P 
REGARDING: ORR, David Jay 
CASE NO.: 001902772 
OFFENSE: Real Estate Broker/Agent With Out 
License, 3rd Degree Felony; 
Securities Fraud, 3rd Degree Felony 
DATE: 05/09/2003 
PROBATION DATE: 05/12/2000 
LEGISLATIVE DATE: 05/11/2003 
DEFENSE ATTY: Larry R. Keller 
OFFENDERS: 139242 
ADDRESS: 5449 W SUNTREE (3350 S.) AVE, 
WEST VALLEY CITY UT 84120 
EMPLOYMENT: Mca-Mark/Consult/Agent, 
Y2 Marketing, 
1801 North Hampton #420, 
Desoto TX 75115 
OMMENTS: 
h 05/12/2000, the defendant was placed on probation with the following conditions: 
Commit no further violations and/or crimes. 
Obtain and maintain lawful, verifiable, full-time employment 
Submit truthful and detailed financial income reports to AP&P as directed. 
Pay fine in the amount of $ 1850.00, payable to the Court. • 
That the defendant avoid all activities involving investments or other financial transactions using assets 
belonging to persons outside of his immediate family or requiring professional licensing. 
Serve 180 days in the Salt Lake County Jail, commencing on 05/12/00, with no credit for time served. 
Have no contact with victims. 
Pay restitution, in an amount to be determined, at a rate of $1000 per month or 25% of monthly income. 
.OBATION UPDATE: The defendant has been indicted federally for Conspiracy To Commit Mail 
iud, Wire Freud and Conspiracy To Defraud The United States, 18 U.S.C. 371. There is four other co-
endants indicted with the defendant According to the indictment, the latest date the defendant is 
irged is in February 2000. The defendant was convicted of his probation case in March 2000 and placed 
probation in May 2000, thus, the new federal charge occurred before the defendant's current Third 
trict probation case. 
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TO 0m Oavid Tay 
*•* «1 R50 court fine He is presently overdue $150 on 
HNES/FEES: B - < ^ ^ ^ ^ J l ' ^ m ^ s department has no. correctly dictated the 
' £ £ £ & £ S S £ 2 S S I "4,553.20 on to case for resnmtron and fines. 
j o^^tmnnthlvrjavments of $1,000 towards restitution. 
.ESfflXmON: ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 0 ^ 1 ^ 5 0 4 . AddinonaHy, Kurt OsUer is owed 
exception of paying in iuu jading federal charges. 
^COMMENPATION^tisrecon^endedbyAdultProbanonandParole^ 
S S S n g be conducted at the Courts convenience.
 y 
^^ELOBERT EGED 
APPROVED 
DENIED: 
DATE: —-^ 
COMMENTS: 
